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LIMITING DIRECTORS' LIABILITY
DEBORAH A. DEMOTr*
I. INTRODUCTION
A substantial risk of personal liability is widely believed to be a deter-
rent to service as a director of a public company, for at least some pro-
spective candidates.1 In the 1980s, suits against corporations and their
directors asserting claims of all sorts multiplied, and some actions led to
large judgments or agreements to pay large settlement amounts.2 Addi-
tionally, contrary to many predictions,3 and to prior trends, in recent
years courts have held directors and officers liable in suits challenging,
not their loyalty to the corporation, but the competence and care with
which they discharged their duties.4 Thus, the risk of an outcome ad-
verse to individual directors or officers in such litigation has become
more real than hypothetical, even when the fiduciaries' decisions are not
afflicted with palpable conflicts of interest. The reality of these risks,
coupled with other factors, caused underwriters of directors' and officers'
('D & '0) liability insurance either to withdraw from that segment of the
insurance market in the mid-1980s or to enhance their premiums drasti-
cally.5 Additionally, many underwriters of professional liability insur-
ance entered the 1980s with a penchant for "cash flow" underwriting.
Under this practice underwriters write policies with premiums that are
* Professor of Law, Duke University. This article draws on material in my treatise, SHARE-
HOLDER DERIVATIVE AcTIONS (1987 & Supp. 1988).
1. See Melloan, A Good Director Is Getting Harder to Find, Wall. St. J., Feb. 9, 1988, at 39,
col. 3 (indemnification removes a great deal of financial risk to prospective directors).
2. See Perkins, Avoiding Director Liability HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1986, at 8, 9.
3. See, eg., Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968); Brudney, The Role of the Board of
Directors: The ALl and Its Critics, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 223, 227 (1983); Cohn, Demise of the
Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judg-
ment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1983).
4. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM
Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d. Cir. 1986) (ordering issuance of preliminary injunction against
exercise of lock-up option).
5. According to a study done by the executive search firm Heidrick & Struggles, in 1986 on
average premiums increased by 506 percent and in 1987 the companies surveyed reported an average
premium increase of 219 percent. Only eight percent of the respondents turned to self insurance,
however, and four out of five reported they had not reduced coverage. See Corporate Restructuring,
Feb. 1988, at 14, col. 2. See also Hilder, Risky Business, Wall. St. J., July 10, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
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admittedly inadequate for the risk, but which are based on the high inter-
est rates that their investments earn. The adverse financial consequences
of cash flow underwriting were aggravated by the underwriters' belief-
in retrospect severely mistaken-that the frequency and severity of
claims would remain constant.'
Prior to these developments, some types of litigation that involved cor-
porate directors as defendants had long been controversial. In particular,
derivative suits-actions brought by a representative shareholder plaintiff
on behalf of a corporation to assert a claim belonging to the corpora-
tion-are perennial objects of criticism. The perennial controversies sur-
rounding derivative litigation are the inevitable consequences of its
principal contemporary function. That function is to call to account cor-
porate managers and controlling shareholders who have abused their re-
lationships with corporations to which they owe obligations of fidelity, or
who have failed to discharge their obligations of care in the management
of corporations' assets.7 To be sure, these controversies have been en-
hanced by other characteristics of derivative litigation. A striking feature
of derivative litigation in the post-Depression era is the frequency with
which the same plaintiffs make their appearance in actions against public
companies.' The repeat plaintiff phenomenon, coupled with the high set-
tlement rate in such actions, has supported the view in some quarters
that, at least in this era, derivative litigation is abusive and socially waste-
ful.9 Other observers are more sanguine, noting that frequency of settle-
ment itself is not adverse if the settlements benefit corporations and their
6. See Mallen & Evans, Surviving the Directors' and Officers Liability Crisis: Insurance and the
Alternatives, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 439, 442 (1987).
7. See, e.g., Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 77-78 (1967)
(emphasizing derivative suit's role as a "needed policeman"); cf. duBeth, 'Big 'in Class Action Stock
Suits, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 2, 1987, at 1, col. 2 (reporting view of defense lawyer that constant threat of
coming to attention of plaintiff's bar has a prophylactic effect on corporate directors and their
counsel).
8. Cf. Lewis v. Anderson, 453 A.2d 474, 475 n.1 (Del. Ch. 1982) (disproving thesis that
"Harry Lewis" was a "street name" employed by various counsel), aff'd, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984).
A search of the Westlaw data bases for federal courts and regional reporters from 1945 to May 1986
led to 81 entries of judicial opinions in derivative or class actions or other securities actions in which
Harry Lewis participated as a plaintiff. But see Lewis v. Black, 74 F.R.D. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (insti-
gation of many lawsuits does not disqualify person from bringing suit or serving as class
representative).
9. This in essence is the thesis of the influential Wood Report, which provided ammunition for
the imposition of security for expense requirements in derivative suits. See F. WOOD, SURVEY AND
REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS (1944).
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LIMITING DIRECTORS' LIABILITY
shareholders.1" For that matter, that certain persons specialize in being
plaintiffs creates no problem if the behavior of these persons in connec-
tion with lawsuits is not objectionable.1
These developments all lent legitimacy to the possibility of adjusting
the law defining directors' liability so that, by reducing directors' risk of
liability, directors' litigation risks might become more readily insurable.
In 1986 and 1987, a number of states amended their corporation statutes,
in a variety of ways, with the goal of reducing a director's risk of per-
sonal liability for money damages in litigation challenging the quality of
the director's service to the corporation. Relatedly, many states also re-
vised their statutory treatment of indemnification and D & 0 liability
insurance so as to actually reduce or facilitate the reduction of the finan-
cial risks to directors and corporate agents that litigation generally
poses.12
Over half the states now expressly permit the inclusion of provisions
that limit or eliminate directors' liability for money damages in corpora-
tions' articles or certificates of incorporation, under circumstances speci-
fied by a statutory enabling provision. Many states modeled their
enabling provisions closely on the Delaware statute,1 3 with some varia-
tions. Other state statutes instead define a limited set of circumstances
under which a director's misfeasance or nonfeasance will make the direc-
tor liable. 4 A few states permit subject corporations to opt out of the
statutory restrictions on liability."5 In contrast, the Virginia statute im-
poses a cap on monetary damages for which directors and officers could
be liable as a result of certain actions.
1 6
The following sections of this article review the technical and policy
10. See Garth, Nagel & Plager, Empirical Research and the Shareholder Derivative Suit: To-
ward a Better-Informed Debate, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (Summer 1985).
11. In a different context, the United States Supreme Court observed in 1985:
[W]e cannot endorse the proposition that a lawsuit, as such, is an evil.... There is no
cause for consternation when a person who believes in good faith and on the basis of accu-
rate information regarding his legal rights that he has suffered a legally cognizable injury
turns to the court for a remedy ......
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 643 (1985).
12. See generally Gelb, Director Due Care Liability: An Assessment of the New Statutes, 61
Temp. L.Q. 13 (1988); Hanks, States Move to Adopt Statutory Limitations on Director Liability, Legal
Times, Oct. 12, 1987; Hazen, Corporate Directors Accountability: The Race to the Bottom-The
Second Lap, 66 N.C.L. REv. 171 (1987).
13. See infra note 18.
14. See infra notes 65-84.
15. See infra notes 78-80.
16. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-692.1 (Supp. 1987).
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issues raised by these statutes and by recent changes in statutes regulat-
ing indemnification and D & 0 insurance. In general it is noteworthy
that substantial questions arise as to the interpretation and efficacy of
many of these statutes. Relatedly, many of these statutes reflect little
effort by their drafters to integrate their import with other sections of the
statute that appear pertinent to issues of directors' liability. As a result
of these unfortunate deficiencies, the risk exposure of directors and of-
ficers to liability is unpredictable. If in fact the goal of these statutory
revisions is to enhance the insurability of directors' litigation risks by
reducing directors' liability, the uncertain effect of some of these statutes
could undercut enhanced insurability. In addition some of these provi-
sions are drafted in a highly detailed style that, perversely enough, makes
it difficult to determine precisely the situations to which they do and do
not apply. Extreme particularization of this sort runs counter to the con-
ventional wisdom that general corporation statutes should be drafted
consistently with a preference for general as opposed to narrow applica-
bility and for prescribing broad standards that apply to more rather than
fewer types of transactions. Finally, the clear impetus for enacting the
provisions was the perceived crisis in the availability of D & 0 insurance
for directors of public companies. Many statutes, however, apply much
more broadly, permitting the reduction of directors' liability in all corpo-
rations, including closely-held ones, and, in some states, in relationship
to claims that raise issues of the defendant's loyalty to the corporation.
II. THE DELAWARE STATUTE AND ITS COUNTERPARTS
A. The Delaware Statute
The Delaware general corporation statute was amended in 1986 to au-
thorize corporations to include language in their certificates of incorpora-
tion that eliminates or limits a director's monetary liability for breach of
fiduciary duty, subject to specified restrictions and exclusions. For firms
already incorporated in Delaware, such a provision could be added to the
firm's certificate through a certificate amendment.17 Section 102(b)(7) of
the statute permits "[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal
liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary
damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director.""8 Under the statute,
no such provision may eliminate or limit a director's liability
17. See infra note 22.
18. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Michie Supp. 1986).
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(i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve
intentional misconduct or knowing violation of law; (iii) under section 174
... ; (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper
personal benefit.19
Section 174 imposes joint and several liability on directors under whose
administration a corporation unlawfully pays a dividend or unlawfully
purchases or redeems stock.20 Finally, under section 102(b)(7) no certifi-
cate provision may "eliminate or reduce the liability of a director for any
act or omission occurring prior to the date when such provision became
effective." 21
The limited scope and effect of the certificate provisions authorized by
section 102(b)(7) is significant. First, in order to invoke the protection of
this section, an existing Delaware corporation must take the affirmative
steps necessary to amend its certificate.22 The provisions authorized by
the statute cannot eliminate, limit or reduce directors' duties to the cor-
poration or redefine the acts that constitute breaches of those duties. Ad-
ditionally, the certificate provision can cover only directors and not
officers or other agents of the corporation and can affect only liability
arising from acts as a director. Furthermore, the provision will reach
only money damages. Other types of remedies-such as injunctions-
and other types of defendants are outside the scope of authorized provi-
sions. The statute also defines broadly the types of breaches of fiduciary
duty against which such a provision would be ineffective; as a result, only
claims that a director breached a fiduciary duty of care, uncomplicated
by any breach of the director's duty of loyalty, would be affected by cer-
tificate provisions authorized by the statute.
Moreover, section 102(b)(7) does not address claims against third par-
ties who benefit as a consequence of the directors' breach of their duty of
care. Consider, for example, a claim that a corporation's directors
breached their duty of care in connection with a sale of assets owned by
the corporation, so that the purchaser of the assets benefitted by acquir-
ing them for less than their value.23 Conventional principles of restitu-
tion oblige the third party, under some circumstances, to disgorge the
19. Id.
20. Id. § 174.
21. Id. § 102(b)(7).
22. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (1983).
23. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
1988)
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benefit received. Section 138(2) of the Restatement of Restitution pro-
vides that "[a] third person who has colluded with a fiduciary in commit-
ting a breach of duty, and who obtained a benefit therefrom, is under a
duty of restitution to the beneficiary."'2 4 For that matter, even an inno-
cent recipient of benefit derived from another's wrongful act is obliged to
make restitution to the person from whom the benefit was obtained, un-
less the innocent recipient gave value for the benefit.25 Innocent recipi-
ents, however, are not liable for gains or profits realized through their
subsequent use of the property received; their liability is limited to the
immediate benefit realized through the defendant's breach.26
Unfortunately, at least for the purposes of this article, the import of
these well-established principles for the problems under discussion awaits
development in the case law. The limitations on directors' liability per-
mitted by section 102(b)(7) and its counterparts in other states may nur-
ture this development. Obvious issues include defining "collusion ' 2 7 and
measuring the benefit received by the third party. A less obvious ques-
tion is whether an appropriately-drafted certificate provision could ever
reduce or eliminate a third party's liability to make restitution for a bene-
fit it derived from directors' breach of duty. If a corporation's sharehold-
ers adopt a certificate provision that explicitly reduces or eliminates the
restitutionary liability of third parties benefitted by any breach by its di-
rectors of their duty of care, should the provision be effective? It is note-
worthy that most of the rationales given for permitting the reduction of
directors' liability are inapplicable to third parties. Directors, but not
third parties, run the risk of liability for damages greatly in excess of the
economic benefits they receive from serving the corporation. The costs
24. RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrUTION § 138(2) (1937). Cf Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 873
(9th Cir. 1988) (nonfiduciary's liability for excessive compensation received from participation in
transactions prohibited by ERISA, with employee retirement plans).
25. See G. PALMER, LAW OF R.STrrUTIoN § 2.20 (1978).
26. Id. at 224-25.
27. If the plaintitf can establish that the third party knew of the directors' breach, is that show-
ing sufficient to establish collusion? Or is an affirmative contribution to the directors' breach by the
third party a requisite for collusion?
These issues can usefully be examined from the perspective of the purchaser of corporate assets
described in the example in the text. On the one hand, typically purchasers do not wish to incur
obligations to pay more for, or to return, the assets they are negotiating to acquire. On the other
hand, typically purchasers do not wish to agree to pay more for assets which the seller is willing to
sell for less. When do principles of restitution oblige the prospective purchaser to offer to pay more?
Or to inform the seller that, as purchaser, it distrusts the seller's conduct?
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of their D & 0 coverage reflect this risk.2" The third party's liability, in
contrast, is precisely to make restitution for the benefit received. Sup-
porters of liability-reducing provisions also argue that, in their absence,
directors are under pressures to behave too cautiously and to avoid risky
business ventures. 29 The risk of restitutionary liability borne by third
parties may affect their behavior, but less visibly so, and less substan-
tially, given the restitutionary measure of recovery.
Finally, a useful analogy can be drawn to the law of trusts, which is
more fully developed on these points.3" The law of trusts permits and
enforces exculpatory provisions in trust instruments that relieve the
trustee of personal liability for some forms of breach of trust."1 But the
liability of third parties-typically transferees of trust property-who
benefit from the trustee's breach of trust is governed by the circum-
stances of the transfer and by the transferee's knowledge of the breach.32
B. Other States' Statutes
A number of states adopted statutory authorizations for such provi-
sions using language substantially identical to that in the Delaware stat-
ute.33 In other states, the statutory enabling language diverges
significantly from the Delaware pattern. Key points of divergence are:
(1) the types of plaintiffs and litigation that the certificate provision can
reach; (2) the types of potential defendants whose liability the certificate
28. See AMERICAN LAW INSTruTE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.17 comment c, at 248-49 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1988).
29. See id. at 249.
30. But see id. § 7.17, Reporter's Note 2, at 269 (analogy to law of trusts is "hardly apposite" in
case of publicly held company because law of trusts contemplates true bargaining between settlor
and trustee whereas certificates of incorporation of public companies are contracts of adhesion that
are read by few shareholders).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222 (1959).
32. See id. §§ 284 & 287-93.
33. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101(u) (Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-54(2) (Michie Supp.
1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.5(8) (West Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8) (Supp.
1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 13(b)(l 1/2) (Supp. 1987); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 21.200(209)(c) (Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(4) (Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-
1-202(2)(v) (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1006(B)(7) (Supp. 1988); OR. REv. STAT. § 16(2)(c)
(19 ); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-48(6) (Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-49.1(1)-(2) (Supp.
1987); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-202(c) (1987).
The Arkansas authorization is comparable to Delaware in its effect. It contains an additional
exception "[flor any action, omission, transaction or breach of a director's duty creating any third-
party liability to any person or entity other than the corporation or stockholder." But, like the
Delaware statute, the Arkansas statute authorizes only provisions respecting a director's liability to
the corporation or its stockholders. See ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 4-27-202(B)(3) (Supp. 1987).
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provisions can affect; (3) the types of conduct and claims resulting in
liability that cannot be reduced or eliminated; (4) whether any reference
is made to statutory standards for directors' conduct or indemnification
of directors; and (5) whether the statute expressly excludes the retroac-
tive application of a certificate provision for events occurring prior to its
adoption. Furthermore, effective adoption of an amendment to a corpo-
ration's certificate or articles of incorporation obviously requires that a
corporation comply with the amendment procedures that the corpora-
tion statute of the corporation's state of incorporation prescribes.
Among the states expressly permitting provisions of the sort under dis-
cussion, only Pennsylvania requires that the provision be contained in a
bylaw adopted by the corporation's shareholders, rather than placed in
its articles or certificate of incorporation. 34
L Type of plaintiffs and litigation
The enabling language in the Delaware statute authorizes provisions
that eliminate or limit a director's liability, "to the corporation or its
stockholders... for breach of fiduciary duty as a director."35 Under this
language, a certificate provision could reduce or eliminate directors' lia-
bility in actions brought by the corporation itself as plaintiff, brought
derivatively on the corporation's behalf, or brought by shareholders as-
serting claims individually or as a class. If an action alleges claims other
than breach of fiduciary duty-such as breach of contract-the author-
ized provision would presumably be inapplicable. In contrast, the Cali-
fornia statute permits only provisions that eliminate or reduce a
director's liability "in an action brought by or in the right of a corpora-
tion for breach of a director's duties to the corporation and its sharehold-
ers as set forth in section 309." 36 Section 309 requires directors to
perform their duties in good faith and with the care, including reasonable
inquiry, that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use in
similar circumstances.37 If the action is not brought by or in the right of
the corporation, the liability-reducing provision would not apply. Thus,
the California enabling language does not reach actions that shareholders
bring singly or as a class which allege that directors breached their du-
ties, including those defined by section 309. This limitation is of practical
34. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8364 (Purdon 1987).
35. See supra note 22.
36. CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(10) (West Supp. 1988).
37. See id. § 309 (West 1977 & Supp. 1988).
[Vol. 66:295
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss2/4
LIMITING DIRECTORS' LIABILITY
significance in California because California's courts have long recog-
nized that directors owe fiduciary duties directly to the corporation's
shareholders as well as to the corporate entity itself."8
South Dakota and North Carolina statutes authorize certificate provi-
sions that extend to a broader range of plaintiffs than does Delaware's
statute. The South Dakota statute authorizes a provision "eliminating or
limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation, its share-
holders, policy holders or depositors for monetary damages for breach of
fiduciary duty as a director."39 The inclusion of policyholders and de-
positors is striking because they are creditors of the corporation and be-
cause the statute does not require their consent to the shareholders'
amendment of the corporation's articles of incorporation.' It strains
credulity to believe that bank depositors or purchasers of insurance poli-
cies would be aware of such limitations in the charter of their bank or
insurance company. Similarly, the North Carolina statutory language
authorizes a provision "limiting or eliminating the personal liability of
each director arising out of an action whether by or in the right of the
corporation or otherwise for monetary damages for breach of his duty as
a director."41 On its face, the phrase "or otherwise" appears to embrace
actions in which the plaintiff is a creditor of the corporation.
2. Types of defendants
Like the Delaware statute, most states' statutes limit the protective
scope of authorized provisions to directors, for claims based on the per-
son's actions or omissions as director. In contrast, the statutory enabling
language in Louisiana42 and Nevada4" permits the inclusion of officers in
the provision.
The New Jersey statute permits certificate provisions limiting or elimi-
nating officers' liability for money damages. 4 The enabling authority for
such provisions, however, was enacted in New Jersey with a two year
38. See Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 108, 460 P.2d 464,472, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592,
599 (1969); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 419, 241 P.2d 66,
75 (1952).
39. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-58.8 (Supp. 1987).
40. See id. §§ 47-2-11, -12 (1983).
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7(11) (Supp. 1987).
42. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24(C)(4) (Supp. 1988).
43. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.145 (1987) (effective Mar. 18, 1987).
44. See N.J. STAT. Ann. § 14A:3-5 (West Supp. 1988) (effective Feb. 4, 1987, expires Feb. 3,
1989).
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"sunset" provision, so that statutory authority for certificate provisions
limiting officers' liability will expire in February 1989 unless the legisla-
ture affirmatively acts to renew the authority. The sunset feature does
not apply to the statutory authority for provisions limiting or eliminating
directors' liability."a Presumably, duly-adopted certificate provisions
that affect officers' liability would survive the demise of the statutory
authorization.
3. Prohibitions on reductions of liability
No state permits universal elimination of directors' liability for all
claims, regardless of their basis. Indeed, many states, like Delaware,
structure their statute's enabling language so that only claims alleging
breach of the directors' duty of care effectively are reached. Nonetheless,
state statutes vary significantly in defining the types of liability that can-
not be eliminated or reduced. Georgia46 and North Carolina,47 in con-
trast with Delaware, do not generally prohibit the reduction of liability
arising from directors' breaches of their duty of loyalty. The Georgia
statute prohibits the elimination or reduction of a director's liability for
"any appropriation, in violation of his duties, of any business opportunity
of the corporation," acts or omissions not in good faith or involving in-
tentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law, illegal distributions
to shareholders, and any transaction from which the director derived an
improper personal benefit.4"
Even fewer categories of liability are not susceptible of reduction under
the North Carolina statute: "acts or omissions not made in good faith
that the director at the time of such breach knew or believed were in
conflict with the best interests of the corporation"; liability for illegal
distributions; and transactions from which the director derived an im-
proper personal benefit.49 In the absence of a personal benefit to the di-
rector, a director's liability stemming from a transaction in which the
director had a conflicting interest (but acted in good faith) can thus be
excluded under the North Carolina statute. Furthermore, the statute
provides that "'improper personal benefit' does not include a director's
compensation or other incidental benefit for or on account of his service
45. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:2-7(3) (Supp. 1987).
46. See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-171(b)(3)(A)-(B) (Supp. 1987).
47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7(11) (Supp. 1987).
48. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-171(b)(3)(A) (Supp. 1978).
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7(11) (Supp. 1987).
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as a director, officer, employee, independent contractor, attorney or con-
sultant of the corporation."50 Thus, under the North Carolina statute, a
certificate provision can effectively insulate a director from liability stem-
ming from the director's receipt of excessive compensation from the cor-
poration, regardless of the capacity in which the director received the
compensation. And, as noted above, the North Carolina statute purports
to authorize certificate provisions applicable to all types of plaintiffs, in-
cluding creditors, trustees in bankruptcy and the Internal Revenue
Service!
Nonetheless, the practical impact of certificate provisions authorized
by the Georgia and North Carolina statutes can be difficult to evaluate.
Suppose a director of a bank also serves as a director of a real estate
development corporation. If the bank makes loans to the real estate de-
veloper, the common director clearly has a conflicting interest with re-
gard to the loan transaction even though the loan is not made to him
directly. Indeed, a conflict of interest exists even if the common director
does not own a substantial amount of equity in the real estate developer.
If the borrower defaults on the loan, and the banking corporation is in-
jured as a result, certificate provisions authorized by the Georgia and
North Carolina statutes could reduce or eliminate any liability incurred
by the banking corporation's directors, including the director in common
with the real estate developer, so long as the director acted in good faith
and did not derive an "improper personal benefit" from the transaction.
What does this phrase mean? If the common director is paid a commis-
sion by the developer (a "loan origination" fee of sorts), surely that is a
personal benefit derived from the loan that is "improper" under conven-
tional fiduciary analysis. Suppose that the common director receives
from the real estate developer only the same director's fee it pays to all
directors. The fee is surely a "personal benefit," but is it an "improper"
personal benefit? Suppose the common director neglects to disclose to
the corporation's shareholders, and her fellow directors, that she serves
the real estate developer as a director and is paid for so doing. Has she
acted in "good faith"?
In this connection, it is noteworthy that these provisions in the Geor-
gia and North Carolina statutes omit any reference to pre-existing statu-
tory sections dealing with directors' conflicts of interest51 and the
50. Id.
51. See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-155 (Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-30 (Supp. 1987).
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consequences of not disclosing them to fellow directors prior to the
board's approval of a transaction in which a director has an adverse in-
terest.52 In any event, it is difficult to argue, as a general matter, that the
fee for serving as a director of the real estate developer is "derived from"
the loan transaction.
On the other hand, certificate provisions of the type under discussion
do not affect the corporation's ability to avoid transactions in which its
directors had conflicting interests. Under the Georgia and North Caro-
lina corporation statutes, unless a quorum of disinterested directors or
the corporation's shareholders approve the transaction after full disclo-
sure of the conflict of interest, the transaction is voidable unless its pro-
ponents establish that it is fair to the corporation.53 Thus, a certificate
provision reducing or eliminating a director's liability for money dam-
ages is not pertinent if the issue is the corporation's ability to avoid the
transaction. If the issue is instead the director's liability for damages in
the wake of an unfortunate transaction, then the Georgia and North Car-
olina statutes authorize the reduction of directors' monetary liability even
if the directors' conduct affecting the transaction did not meet the statu-
tory standard prescribing conditions to make the transaction enforceable
against the corporation. That is, unless the director derived an improper
personal benefit from the transaction or failed to act in good faith, he is
not financially liable for the transaction's untoward consequences, even if
the director failed to disclose a conflicting interest prior to the directors'
authorization of the transaction, and even if, as of the time of its adop-
tion, the transaction was not fair to the corporation.
Moreover, the structure of these statutes undercuts an argument that a
director's failure to disclose the conflicting interest in itself establishes
that the director did not act in good faith. In both statutes, the sections
dealing with transactions in which directors had conflicting interests ex-
pressly provide for disclosure of the director's conflicting interest as a
route through which the transaction may be made enforceable against
the corporation. That the director with the conflicting interest "acted in
good faith" is not an express criterion. Thus, against this background, an
equation of "acting in good faith" with prior disclosure of the director's
conflicting interest is difficult to justify. And suppose the director is able
to establish that he believed the transaction to be beneficial for the corpo-
52. See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-155(1)(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-30(b)(1).
53. See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-155; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-30.
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ration. Arguably the director "acted in good faith" despite his failure to
disclose a conflicting interest. In short, these statutes create a troubling
discontinuity between the standards for directors' liability for the conse-
quences of transactions, and the standards regulating director conduct
preceding corporate involvement in transactions. To the extent they un-
dercut incentives for disclosure by directors of conflicting interests, their
effect is likely to be unfortunate. 54
The Washington statute likewise defines narrowly the types of liability
that cannot be reduced or eliminated through certificate provisions.
Washington prohibits the elimination or reduction of liability for acts or
omissions that involve knowing violations of law or intentional miscon-
duct, illegal distributions to shareholders, and "for any transaction from
which the director will receive a benefit in money, property, or services to
which the director is not legally entitled."" In the absence of personal
benefit to the director, that the director did not act in good faith, or that
the director had a conflicting interest as to a transaction, would not pre-
clude the elimination or reduction of the director's liability under this
statute. Indeed, the Washington statute appears to authorize provisions
that exculpate directors who fail to disclose the existence of a conflicting
interest, as well as directors who fail to act in good faith. Thus, arguably
under this statute a certificate provision could exculpate from liability a
director with a conflicting interest in a transaction who neither disclosed
the existence of that interest to his fellow directors prior to their approval
of the transaction, nor honestly believed the transaction to be beneficial
to the corporation.
In contrast, the Tennessee statute does not expressly prohibit the re-
duction or elimination of liability when the director has received an im-
proper personal benefit from a transaction. Like Delaware, however,
Tennessee's statute prohibits the reduction or elimination of any liability
arising from breaches of the director's duty of loyalty.56
Finally, under the New York statute, whether a particular director's
liability can be eliminated or limited turns on the outcome of litigation:
[no certificate provision shall eliminate or limit] the liability of any director
if a judgment or other final adjudication adverse to him establishes that his
54. Cf Gelb, supra note 12, at 35 (indeterminacy of good faith criterion); see generally Barnard,
Curbing Management Conflict of Interest-The Search for an Effective Deterrent, 40 RUTGERS L.
REV. 369 (1988) (inadequacy of present deterrents to managerial self-dealing).
55. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.12.020(d) (Supp. 1988).
56. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-102(b)(3) (Supp. 1987).
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acts or omissions were in bad faith or involved intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law or that he personally gained in fact a financial
profit or other advantage to which he was not legally entitled or that he
violated the statutory restrictions on distributions to shareholders.57
Presumably, if the litigation is resolved through settlement without any
judgment or final adjudication establishing such matters, the director's
liability could be eliminated or limited through the certificate provision.
As a practical matter, the structure of the New York statute provides a
large disincentive to a plaintiff to settle an action contesting whether a
director's conduct met the statutory standards for permissible
exculpation.
4. Reference to statutory standards for directors' conduct or
indemnification of directors
An obvious technical issue, which regrettably only a few statutes ad-
dress, is the relationship between authorized provisions that reduce or
limit directors' liability and the standards for directors' conduct and lia-
bility that are specified by statute, as well as statutory provisions that
regulate corporate indemnification of directors. The Delaware corpora-
tion statute contains no statutory definition of the standard of conduct
with which directors must discharge their duties and thus has no coun-
terpart to California Corporations Code section 309, discussed above.58
Not surprisingly, the Delaware statutory provision that authorizes the
reduction or elimination of directors' liability makes no cross reference to
a statutory standard applicable to directors' conduct in office. What is
surprising is that a number of states which specify by statute the stan-
dards for directors' discharge of their duties neglect to refer to these stan-
dards in the additional statutory provision authorizing the reduction or
elimination of directors' liability through charter provisions. In the in-
terests of clarity it is desirable that reference be made to such standards
in the statutory language authorizing certificate provisions that reduce or
eliminate directors' liability for money damages for breach of their
duties.
Indeed, Tennessee enacted a new corporation statute, effective in Janu-
ary 1988, that authorizes charter provisions "eliminating or limiting the
personal liability of a director to the corporation or its shareholders for
57. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(b)(1)-(2) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
58. See supra text accompanying note 19.
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monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director."5 9 This
section of the statute, however, makes no reference to the section pre-
scribing the standards for directors' discharge of their duties, which con-
cludes with the statement that "[a] director is not liable for any action
taken as a director, or any failure to take any action, if he performed the
duties of his office in compliance with this section."'  If the statute's
drafters intended for charter provisions to reduce or eliminate the liabil-
ity of a director whose conduct failed to meet the standard specified in
the statute, greater clarity would have been achieved by expressly stating
SO.
6 1
Several of the statutes that authorize provisions to reduce or eliminate
directors' liability omit any cross reference between that section and the
statute's regulation of indemnification. Thus, the following questions,
among others, may arise: (1) Even if the director, by virtue of an author-
ized certificate provision, is not liable for money damages in an action,
under what circumstances may the corporation indemnify the director
for litigation expenses incurred in the defense of the action? (2) If the
director makes a monetary contribution to the settlement of the action,
may the corporation indemnify the director in that amount? (3) If the
director's liability cannot be excluded by an authorized certificate provi-
sion, then when will the director's litigation expenses and contribution to
any settlement or judgment be indemniflable by the corporation? An ex-
ample of useful cross-referencing is a provision in the Georgia treatment
of indemnification. This provision explicitly provides that liabilities that
cannot be reduced or eliminated through a provision in the corporation's
articles cannot be the object of claims to indemnity that were created by
a contract or corporate bylaw or a corporate resolution, beyond the stat-
ute's own provision for and regulation of indemnification.62 Additional
issues in this context raised by the statutory regulation of indemnification
are discussed in Section V.
59. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-102(bX3) (Supp. 1987).
60. Id. § 48-18-301(d).
61. Additional technical questions are raised by the general failure of these statutory authoriza-
tions to refer expressly to the statute's general treatment of self-dealing transactions between direc-
tors and the companies they serve. A notable exception is Section 10-054(A)(9) of the Revised
Statutes of Arizona (Supp. 1987), which excludes from the scope of permissible limitations on liabil-
ity "[a] violation of § 10-041," which is the statute's general treatment of conflict of interest
transactions.
62. See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-156(f) (Supp. 1987). See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.4A.3;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-502 (Supp. 1987); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.025 (Supp. 1988).
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5. Retroactive effect
Under the Delaware statute, a director's liability arising from an act or
omission that occurred prior to the date upon which the corporation ef-
fectively adopted the provision reducing or eliminating directors' liability
cannot be affected by the provision. 63 Although most states' statutes
contain a comparable express exclusion, the Texas statute does not.64 If
shareholders, under this statute, adopt a general provision that purports
to relieve directors from liability arising from prior acts or omissions, the
shareholders would not necessarily have notice of any particular acts or
omissions that might have given rise to liability. If the shareholders
lacked such notice, it is not likely that their adoption of the general pro-
vision will be effective in releasing the directors from liability for prior
undisclosed acts or omissions. How can shareholders release a claim on
behalf of the corporation or themselves if they do not know what the
claim consists of? In short, persuading shareholders to adopt such a pro-
vision is not likely to be an effective end run around the disclosure requi-
site to an effective ratification of prior acts by the corporation's directors.
III. STATUTORY STANDARDS FOR ,DIRECTORS' LIABILITY
In contrast to the enabling legislation in Delaware and its counterparts
elsewhere, some states, in 1986 and 1987, adopted statutes that specified
the circumstances under which a director's breach would result in per-
sonal liability. The statutes were to reduce the effective risk to directors.
The approaches taken by these statutes vary considerably, and some of
the provisions are afflicted with technical difficulties.
The 1987 amendments to the Florida statute probably raise the largest
number of technical questions, due to the drafters' proclivity for differen-
tiated treatment of liability depending on the plaintiff's identity. Section
607.1545 of the Florida Corporation Act, added in 1987, provides that a
director shall not be personally liable for money damages, "to the corpo-
ration or any other person for any statement, vote, decision, or failure to
act, regarding corporate management or policy" unless the director
breached or failed to perform his duties and that breach or failure fits
within one of five enumerated categories.65 The first three of these are of
general applicability. They are: (1) a violation of criminal law, "unless
63. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Michie Supp. 1986).
64. See TEX. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 7.06(B) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
65. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1645(1) (West Supp. 1988).
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the director had reasonable cause to believe his conduct was lawful or
had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful"; (2) a
transaction from which the director directly or indirectly derived an im-
proper personal benefit; and (3) an illegal distribution to shareholders. If
the action is brought by the corporation itself, or in its right, or in the
right of a shareholder, then the fourth category applies: "conscious dis-
regard for the best interest of the corporation, or willful misconduct."6 6
If the action is brought by a plaintiff other than a shareholder or the
corporation or a shareholder suing on behalf of the corporation, the fifth
category is applicable: "recklessness or an act or omission which was
committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibit-
ing wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property., 67
A separate subsection of section 607.1645, as it happens, contains a nar-
row definition of "recklessness," discussed below.68
Moreover, a subsequent section of the statute defines "improper per-
sonal benefit" in a fashion that may raise insurmountable technical obsta-
cles to its interpretation. 69 The section, however, appears designed to
preclude the argument that a director has derived an "improper personal
benefit" from a transaction if a majority of the corporation's disinterested
directors, after disclosure to them of the nature of the personal benefit,
approved or ratified the transaction. 70 None of the Florida statutory pro-
visions state whether they apply only to claims arising after their effective
date. Further complicating the analysis is the omission from these 1987
statutory amendments of any reference to the statute's pre-existing sec-
tion requiring directors to perform their duties in good faith and with
that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person would deploy
66. Id. § (1)(b)(4).
67. Note that this provision on its face applies to actions brought by "any other person," other
than the corporation itself or its shareholders. IaL § (1)(b)(5).
68. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1645(2) (West Supp. 1988). This subsection defines "recklessness"
as an action or omission "in conscious disregard of a risk" known or so obvious it should have been
known to the director, "as to make it highly probable that harm would follow from such action or
omission." Under this standard, the magnitude of the risk, that is its propensity to result in harm, is
a component of what the director "consciously" disregards.
69. See Id. § 607.165. One difficulty is that subsection (1)(a) is constructed grammatically to
resist successful parsing. It provides: "[A] director is deemed not to have derived an improper
personal benefit... [iun an action other than a derivative suit regarding a decision by the director
regarding a decision by the director to approve, reject, or otherwise affect the outcome of an offer to
purchase the stock of... the corporation ... ." To what actions does this subsection apply? All non-
derivative actions? All non-derivative actions as well as all derivative actions, other than derivative
actions concerning director's decisions regarding offers to purchase the corporation's shares?
70. Id. § 607.165(l)(a).
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under similar circumstances.7 1
Given their structure and scope, the Florida provisions raise a number
of perplexing questions. Suppose the director of a bank knows, or should
know, that its officers are making loans to their close associates on terms
more favorable than the terms upon which the bank makes loans avail-
able to non-insiders. If the bank subsequently fails, and an action is
brought on behalf of its creditors, depositors or the depositors' insurer,
the director's liability should presumably be assessed under the "reckless-
ness" standard described above, unless the loan transactions were illegal
or conferred a direct or indirect personal benefit on the director. Under
the statute's definition of "reckless" behavior, the director's action (in
approving the loans) or omission (in failing to object to them) is not cul-
pable unless the director proceeded "in conscious disregard" of a risk
known or so obvious that it should have been known to the director.
Additionally, under the statutory definition the director's conduct is not
reckless unless the risk was known to be, or obviously was, one that made
it "highly probably that harm would follow" from the director's act or
omission. Thus, in the example under discussion, the director's conduct
is not reckless unless the hapless bank is so unfortunate as to have only
insider loans or default-prone borrowers in its loan portfolio, or unless a
particular loan can be identified which itself made the bank's failure
highly probable, or perhaps unless the particular loan was known to bear
a "highly probable" risk of default. Further, unless the director has ac-
tual knowledge of the loans, the "conscious disregard" test is impossible
to apply.
Additionally, unless the director received a personal benefit from the
transaction, actions brought directly against the director herself by the
corporation are subject to the "conscious disregard" or "wilful miscon-
duct" standard. If the director has a conficting interest in a particular
transaction, but receives no personal benefit from it, the corporation can-
not recover unless the director acted with "conscious disregard" of its
best interests. This standard applies awkwardly, at best, to many situa-
tions. Suppose the director neglects to disclose his conflicting interest to
fellow directors prior to their approval of the problematic transaction.
Does the failure to disclose alone constitute "wilful misconduct" or
"conscious disregard" of the corporation's best interests? Or does it con-
71. See id. § 607.111(4) (West 1976). Subsection (7) provides that "[a] person who performs
his duties in compliance with this section shall have no liability by reason of being or having been a
director of the corporation."
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stitute bad faith? Finally, like the provisions in the North Carolina and
Georgia statutes discussed above, these amendments to the Florida stat-
ute make no reference to the statute's pre-existing treatment of director
conflicts of interest.72
Unlike the Florida statue, the Ohio statute integrated the 1986 amend-
ments into a pre-existing section specifying directors' duties to the corpo-
ration. As amended, section 1701.5903) of the General Corporation Law
requires a director to perform his duties in good faith, in a manner "he
reasonably believes to be in or or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation, and with the care that an ordinary prudent person in a like
position would use under similar circumstances. ' 73  In any action
brought against a director, the plaintiff must prove "by clear and con-
vincing evidence," that the director violated his statutory duties.74 As
written, the "clear and convincing" standard would apply to all actions
against directors, including actions brought by creditors and actions con-
testing transactions in which a director had a conflicting interest. Under
a separate subsection of the statute, a director is liable for money dam-
ages, "only if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence ... that his
action or failure to act involved an act or omission undertaken with de-
liberate intent to cause injury to the corporation or undertaken with
reckless disregard for the best interests of the corporation. '75 The appli-
cability of the restriction on directors' liability for money damages is lim-
ited. It does not apply to actions involving illegal distributions or loans
to officers, directors, or shareholders made other than in the usual course
of business.76 Nor does it limit the relief available under the general stat-
utory regulation of transactions between the corporation and its directors
or officers.7 7 Additionally, a corporation may opt out of this limitation
on directors' liability for money damages through a provision in its arti-
cles or bylaws.78
Under the Ohio statute, none of these restrictions on directors' liability
(including the "clear and convincing" standard) applies to a director of a
corporation whose shares are not publicly traded, if that director votes
for or assents to any action taken by the corporation's directors that "in
72. See id. § 607.124.
73. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(B) (Anderson Supp. 1987).
74, Id. § 1701.59(C).
75. Id. § 1701.59(D).
76. See id. § 1701.95.
77. See id. § 1701.60.
78. See id. § 1701.59(D).
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connection with a change in control of the corporation, directly results in
the holder or holders of a majority of the outstanding shares of the cor-
poration receiving a greater consideration for their shares than other
shareholders." 9 Otherwise, by implication, the restrictions on directors'
liability appear to apply. Why, one wonders, is this exception applicable
only to actions against directors of corporations whose shares are not
publicly traded? If preferential treatment of majority shareholders is in-
jurious to minority shareholders, the injury seems no less if the corpora-
tion's shares are publicly traded.
Wisconsin, like Ohio, amended its corporation statute to define nar-
rowly the circumstances under which directors could be held liable for
money damages. Like Ohio, Wisconsin expressly permits corporations
to opt out from the limitation. In contrast with the Ohio statute, which
applies to all actions contesting directors' discharge of their duties as di-
rectors,80 the Wisconsin provision applies more narrowly. It provides
that "a director is not liable to the corporation, its shareholders, or any
person asserting rights on behalf of the corporation or its sharehold-
ers.""1 In such litigation, the director is not liable for any monetary lia-
bility unless the plaintiff proves that the director's breach or failure to
perform constituted (1) "[a] wilful failure to deal fairly with the corpora-
tion or its shareholders in connection with a matter in which the director
has a material conflict of interest"; (2) a violation of criminal law, unless
the director had reasonable cause to believe his conduct lawful or had no
reasonable cause to believe it unlawful; (3) a transaction from which the
director derived an improper personal benefit; or (4) wilful misconduct.82
Like the Ohio limitation, the Wisconsin limitation does not apply to ille-
gal distributions to shareholders or to insider loans. Unlike Ohio, Wis-
consin imposes no special burden of proof on plaintiffs litigating against
directors. A corporation may opt out of the Wisconsin limitation
through a certificate provision.
3
Indiana, Missouri and New York have revised their corporation stat-
utes to reduce directors' risk of liability, although these revisions are
troublesome in somewhat different respects. The Indiana amendment
provides that a director is not liable for any action taken as a director or
79. Id. § 1701.59(F).
80. See id. § 1701.59(B), (C), (D) & (F)(1).
81. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 180.307(1) (West Supp. 1987).
82. Id. § 180.307(1)(a)-(d).
83. See id. § 180.307(3).
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any failure to take action unless the director breached or failed to per-
form the duties of a director that the statute prescribes, and, "[tihe
breach or failure to perform constitutes willful misconduct or reckless-
ness." 4 Note that this standard applies even to actions against a director
involving transactions in which the director had a conflicting interest,
and applies regardless of the identity of the plaintiff.
The Missouri 5 and New York8 6 amendments expand the criteria that
directors may properly take into account in evaluating proposals to ac-
quire the company that they serve as directors. Under the Missouri stat-
ute, in evaluating an acquisition proposal, directors exercising their
business judgment "may consider" a number of factors provided for in
the statute. The stated factors include "[s]ocial, legal and economic ef-
fects on employees, suppliers, customers and others having similar rela-
tionships with the corporation, and the communities in which the
corporation conducts its businesses.""7 The stated factors, however, are
not exclusive. In contrast, the New York statute provides that in this
context "a director shall be entitled to consider, without limitation, both
the long-term and short-term interests of the corporation and its share-
holders."8 8 Both of these provisions are by their terms merely permis-
sive, and thus do not appear to impose on the directors a duty or
obligation to consider the stated criteria.
Although narrower in scope, the Missouri and New York provisions
resemble in other respects statutory provisions in Ohio and Minnesota
which articulate a variety of interests and factors that directors may ap-
propriately take into account in discharging their duties to the corpora-
tion. Under the Minnesota statute, a director "may, in considering the
best interests of the corporation," in discharging the duties of a director
"consider the interests of the corporation's employees, customers, suppli-
ers and creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community and
societal considerations, and the long-term as well as the short-term inter-
ests of the corporation and its shareholders."8 9 Although the Minnesota
statute concludes that directors may consider the possibility that these
interests will best be served if the corporation continues to be independ-
84. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (Bums Supp. 1987).
85. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
86. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
87. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
88. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
89. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1987).
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ent, the statute is not limited in its effect to directors' consideration of
acquisition proposals. Likewise, although the Ohio statute mentions
"continued independence of the corporation" as a factor directors may
appropriately consider, it permits directors to take into account the pan-
oply of interests endorsed by the Minnesota statute in the context of all
decisions made by the directors, not only those responsive to acquisition
proposals. 9° Thus, three of these statutes-Minnesota, Missouri and
Ohio-expressly permit directors to consider-and by implication to act
with referernce to-interests other than those of the corporation itself and
its shareholders. Taken at face value, these statutes endorse a stunning
departure from the fiduciary constraints applicable to directors' deci-
sions. In sharp contrast, the Delaware Supreme Court held in Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc. 91 that when a company is for
sale, the board's sole duty is to maximize its sale value for the stockhold-
ers' benefit.92 By enlarging the range of interests directors may consider
(when a company is "for sale" and in other contexts as well) these stat-
utes may well vitiate the strength of fiduciary accountability. Once loy-
alty to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders is treated as
merely another "factor" directors may consider, fiduciary obligation is
effectively trivialized.
IV. STATUTORY CAPS ON LIABILITY
Directors' liability for money damages may also be reduced through
the imposition, by statute, of a maximum amount for which directors
may be held liable for specified types of claims. Key issues concerning
liability caps are the types of claims (and the types of potential plaintiffs)
reached by the cap and the ability of shareholders of any particular cor-
poration to opt into or out of the cap. The reporters for the ALI corpo-
rate governance project have proposed that corporations be permitted in
their certificates of incorporation to establish a ceiling on officers' and
directors' liability for breaches of their duty of care to the corporation, or
to limit or preclude directors' liability for damages altogether. The ceil-
ing amount would be related to the amount of compensation that the
90. OHIo REV. STAT. ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson Supp. 1987).
91. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
92. Id. at 182; accord Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886-87 (6th Cir. 1986) (apply-
ing Michigan law).
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fiduciary received from the corporation. 93
The Virginia Stock Corporation Act was amended in 1987 to impose a
specific cap on monetary damages recoverable from officers and directors
"in any proceeding brought by or in the right of a corporation or brought
by or on behalf of the shareholders of the corporation." 94 The cap appli-
cable to derivative or shareholder litigation is, for any single transaction,
occurrence or course of conduct, the lesser of (1) the monetary amount
specified in the corporation's articles or in a bylaw adopted by its share-
holders; or (2) the greater of (a) $100,000 or (b) the cash compensation
received by the officer or director in the twelve months preceding the
action or omission at issue.95 Note that the formula in the Virginia stat-
ute is structured to permit a corporation to specify an amount less than
$100,000 or the cash compensation amount, but not a greater amount.
Thus, "opting out" of the cap is not possible. In this respect, the Virginia
statute differs from the ALI proposal discussed above, which requires
"opting in" through the adoption of a charter provision, as well as the
Delaware-pattern statutes, which merely authorize the adoption of char-
ter provisions to "reduce or eliminate" directors' liability. And the Vir-
ginia cap provisions apply to officers as well as directors. Under the
Virginia statute, the cap does not apply if the officer or director engaged
in wilful misconduct, a knowing violation of the criminal law or of any
federal or state securities law.96 But, in contrast to charter provisions
that the Delaware statute authorizes, the Virginia cap presumably ap-
plies to actions alleging self-dealing by the director or officer and to cir-
cumstances in which the director or officer did not act in good faith,
unless the director's or officer's behavior constituted "wilful
misconduct." 97
V. INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE
Directors, like other defendants, bear certain financial risks created by
litigation even if no final judgment ever finds them liable. These risks
include incurring expenses for defending against the action and agreeing
93. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATEGOVERNANCE AND STRUC-
TURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7:17 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1988).
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1(A) (Supp. 1987).
95. Id. § 13.1-692.1(A).
96, Id. § 13.1-692.1(B).
97. See Honabach, All That Glitters: A Critique of the Revised Virginia Stock Corporation Act,
12 J. CORP. L. 433, 474 (1987).
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to pay settlement amounts even if the suit never reaches the point of final
judgment on the merits. Corporation statutes regulate the corporation's
ability to reduce the financial consequences of litigation for its directors,
employers and agents by indemnifying them against judgment and settle-
ment amounts, and the expenses of defense, and by paying their litigation
expenses as the expenses are incurred. In 1986 and 1987, a number of
states amended their statutory regulations of indemnification, in a variety
of ways. These changes affected the availability of indemnification to
corporate directors, employees and agents.
The most significant of these changes have the effect of enabling more
persons' claims for indemnification to be presented as mandatory claims
on the corporation, so that the issue is not the corporation's discretionary
right to indemnify but its obligation to do so. This shift is of evident
value to prospective indemnitees because it provides some insulation
agai4st a change in the identity of the persons in control of the corpora-
tion. True, corporations are occasionally reported to resist paying
mandatory claims for indemnification,9" but such claimants at least have
legally cognizable rights created by contract or statute.
Most corporation statutes have long-standing provisions mandating
that a corporation indemnify its directors, employees and agents for their
litigation expenses if they are successful in defending against the action.99
In Minnesota, and more recently in North Dakota and Wisconsin, essen-
tially all indemnification pursuant to the statute is mandatory if the
claimant's conduct fits within the statutory requisites. 1°° For example,
under the Wisconsin statute, subject to contrary provision in the corpora-
tion's articles, the corporation is obliged to indemnify an officer or direc-
tor to the extent he is successful on the merits or otherwise in a
proceeding;1"' additionally, the corporation must indemnify against lia-
bility that a director or officer incurs in a proceeding brought against him
by virtue of his position with the corporation, unless his breach or failure
to perform fits within any of four categoiies of conduct.10 2 These four
98. See, e.g., Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339 (Del. 1983).
99. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 145(c)(1979) (success "on the merits or otherwise");
REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.52 ("wholly successful, on the merits or otherwise"); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 317(d)(West 1977) (indemnification of expenses mandatory to the extent the agent has been
"successful on the merits").
100. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.521 (West Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-91
(Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.042-.059 (West Supp. 1987).
101. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.042-.059 (West Supp. 1987).
102. See id.
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categories are: "wilful failure to deal fairly with the corporation or its
shareholders in a matter in which the director or officer has a material
conflict of interest"; a violation of criminal law unless the defendant
lacked reasonable cause to believe his conduct unlawful; a transaction
from which the defendant deprived an improper personal benefit; and
wilful misconduct.1"3 In Wisconsin, like Minnesota and North Dakota,
although the scope of mandatory indemnification is subject to contrary
provision in the corporation's articles or bylaws, the fact that the statute
itself creates such a presumption is significant given the affirmative steps
required to opt out of the statutory pattern.
The same shift toward mandatory indemnification is reflected in sev-
eral states' enactment of amendments which expressly make the statu-
tory regulation of indemnification non-exclusive of the provision of
additional rights to indemnification created by contract or by a corpora-
tion's charter or bylaws. These statutes permit the creation of enforcea-
ble rights to indemnification. In some instances, a person with a contract
right to indemnification may not have a claim to mandatory indemnifica-
tion under the statute because he has not met the statutory criterion for
mandatory indemnification. Thus, statutes permitting the creation of ad-
ditional rights to indemnification enable corporations to opt into
mandatory obligations to indemnify. These statutory specifications of
non-exclusivity vary in whether they expressly impose limits on the cor-
poration's ability freely to create additional rights. For example, under
the Iowa statute such additional rights may not be created on behalf of
defendants in actions brought by or in the right of the corporation itself.
Indemnification with respect to such actions is limited to the standards
and procedures specified in the indemnification statute itself.1" More-
over, under the Iowa statute the corporation may not create additional
rights to indemnification for those circumstances in which a statute bars
the corporation from reducing or eliminating a director's liability for
money damages through a provision in its articles. 05 A comparable lim-
itation on the corporation's ability to create additional rights to indem-
nity is imposed by statute in Georgia,"° Washington,10 7 and New
103. See id.
104. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.4A(2) & (7) (West Supp. 1987).
105. Id. § 496A.4A(7).
106. See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-156(f) (Supp. 1987).
107. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.025(8) (Supp. 1988).
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Jersey. 10
By contrast, in some states, the statutory authorization for the creation
of "additional" rights to indemnification states no express exclusions, 10 9
or permits indemnification when the director's liability could not be re-
duced or eliminated through a charter provision. 10 In such states, the
ability of a court to impose constraints derived from public policy on
extra-statutory rights to indemnity may readily become an issue. The
long-standing provision in the Delaware statute authorizing "additional"
rights has conventionally been understood to be subject to an implicit
exclusion, on public policy grounds, of categorical obligations to indem-
nify that bind the corporation independent of the merits of the particular
claimant's conduct. 11 Courts interpreting Massachusetts law, however,
have been reluctant to acknowledge the existence of a residual judicial
prerogative to invalidate particular rights to indemnity in light of the
sweeping and unqualified language used by the legislature.112
The statutory authorizations for "additional" rights to indemnification
also differ in their treatment of the corporation's ability to create rights
to indemnification with respect to litigation arising from the claimant's
conduct in some capacity other than his official capacity with the corpo-
ration. For example, section 145 of the Delaware statute expressly states
108. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(8) (West Supp. 1988).
109. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(g) (West Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. i, § 145(f) (Supp.
1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-15 (Burns Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.14.1(g) (Supp.
1987).
110. See, eg., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(b)(1)(McKinney Supp. 1988) (prohibiting provision
reducing or eliminating director's liability if final adjudication establishes director acted in bad faith,
or director's act or omission involved intentional misconduct or knowing violation of law, or director
received financial profit or other advantage to which director was not legally entitled) and § 721 (no
indemnification may be made on behalf of director or officer if final adjudication establishes acts
were committed in bad faith, or were the result of active and deliberate dishonesty and were material
to the cause of action adjudicated, or the director or officer received a financial profit or other advan-
tage to which he was not legally entitled); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7(11) (Supp. 1987) (directors'
liability may not be reduced or eliminated by charter provision if director's acts or omissions not in
good faith, or believed not to be in corporation's best interests, or director derived an improper
personal benefit from transaction) and § 55-19 (corporation may not indemnify against liability or
litigation expense if claimant's activities were known or believed by him at the time they were under-
taken to be clearly in conflict with corporation's best interests).
111. See Johnston, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers,
33 Bus. LAW. 1993, 2010 (1978). Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-507(3) (Supp. 1987) (statute per-
mitting creation of additional rights to indemnification expressly limits corporation's power to create
such rights "to the extent, consistent with public policy").
112. See Dynan v. Fritz, 400 Mass. 230, 508 N.E.2d 1371, 1379-80 (1987) (construing MASS.
ANN. LAWS, ch. 156B, § 67).
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that indemnification and advancement of expenses provided by or
granted pursuant to the statute "shall not be deemed exclusive of any
other rights" of the claimant "both as to action in his official capacity
and as to action in another capacity while holding such office.""' 3 Thus,
under this statute, and others with comparable provisions,1 14 the corpo-
ration's ability to create rights to indemnity for acts undertaken in the
claimant's "unofficial" capacity is limited to acts occurring while the
claimant held his official position as a director, officer, employee or agent.
Claims arising from acts committed prior to the person's assumption of
"official capacity" could not be encompassed by the right to indemnifica-
tion. In contrast, the North Carolina statute by implication imposes a
stricter limit on the corporation's ability to create rights to indemnity for
the consequences of actions undertaken in a capacity other than the per-
son's offical capacity with the corporation. Under that statute, the cor-
poration expressly has power to create rights to indemnity for "any
person who, at the request of the corporation, is or was serving as a di-
rector, officer, employee, or agent of another corporation, partnership,
joint venture, trust or other enterprise or as a trustee or administrator
under an employee benefit plan.""' 5 Finally, some states' authorizations
for the creation of "additional" rights to indemnity place neither of these
limitations on the corporation's ability to create such rights." 6
A number of state statutes now expressly authorize" 7 or mandate," 8
under stated circumstances, the indemnification of amounts paid to settle
derivative litigation or, under some circumstances, amounts paid in final
113. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 145(f) (Supp. 1986).
114. See, eg., CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(g) (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-156(f)
(Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.4A(7) (West Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-4.1(g)
(Supp. 1987).
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-19(a) (Supp. 1987). Prior to an amendment enacted in 1986, the
statutory provision for indemnification in the North Carolina statute was expressly exclusive and not
susceptible of expansion through agreement. See R. ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION
LAW AND PRACTICE § 15-1 (Supp. 1987).
116. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-15 (Bums Supp. 1987); MAss ANN. LAWS, ch. 156B,
§ 67 (Law. Co-op. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(8) (West Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus. CORP. L.
§ 721 (McKinney Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-507(3) (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 23A.08.025(8) (Supp. 1988).
117. See MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 450.1562 (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.355(1)
(Vernon Supp. 1988); NEV. REv. STAT. § 78.751(2) (Supp. 1987); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(c)
(McKinney 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-502(a) (Supp. 1987); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
§ 2.02-1(B), (C), (D), & (E) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
118. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.014(2) (West Supp. 1988).
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judgment. 119 Because the settlement amounts and final judgments in
such an action are usually paid to the corporation itself, permitting in-
demnification is circular. Moreover, some states have amended their
statutory regulation of indemnification for such actions to minimize the
number of situations in which a court must approve the corporation's
determination that a claimant meets the statutory standard for indemnifi-
cation. Under the Louisiana statute, as amended in 1986, judicial ap-
proval is required for the indemnification of claimants adjudged liable,
after the exhaustion of all appeals, for wilful or intentional misconduct in
actions brought by or in the right of the corporation.' 20 In the absence of
such a final determination of liability, the corporation's directors, its
shareholders or independent legal counsel may make the determination
that a claimant meets the standard for indemnification. In contrast, the
Delaware statute requires judicial approval for indemnification in a
broader range of cases. Section 145(b) of the Delaware statute requires
judicial approval when the claimant has been adjudged liable to the cor-
poration, regardless of the grounds for such liability. I2' Finally, a
number of statutes now expressly authorize the use of self-insurance or
other alternatives to the purchase of D & 0 insurance from a third party
insurance underwriter regardless of whether the corporation itself would
have power directly to indemnify against the claims covered by the
policy. 122
VI. CONCLUSION
The statutory revisions discussed in this article have been character-
ized as legislative responses that attempt to solve crises in directors' lia-
bility and in the availability of D & 0 insurance. In a number of
respects, however, some of these solutions have overtaken the crises that
legitimated their enactment. True, no single state has enacted a combi-
119. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-8 (Burns Supp. 1987).
120. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:83(A) (West Supp. 1988).
121. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 145(b) (Supp. 1986).
122. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(i) (West Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101.5(9) (Supp.
1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:83(F) (West Supp. 1988); Ch. 28, Nev. Laws 187 (effective March
17, 1987); N.J. REv. STAT. § 14A:3-5(9) (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-114.1(J) (Supp.
1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(7) (Anderson Supp. 1987); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 2.01-2(R) (Vernon Supp. 1988). Under the Nevada statute, however, no "financial arrangement"
may provide protection for a person adjudged, after exhaustion of all appeals, liable for intentional
misconduct, fraud or knowing violation of law, except with regard to court-ordered indemnification
or advancement of expenses. Ch. 28, § 2, Nev. Laws 1987.
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nation of the least appealing features of these statutes, but one ought not
be entirely sanguine that all states will successfully resist appeals to do
so. At present, some states permit charter provisions that reduce or elim-
inate directors' liability in actions brought by creditors; others permit
these provisions to reduce or eliminate the liability of officers as well as
directors. In one state the charter provision could operate retroac-
tively;123 and in several states directors' liability could be reduced or
eliminated even if an action raises serious questions as to the director's
loyalty. 124 Some states have effectively trivialized directors' fiduciary ob-
ligation by defining fidelity to the interests of the corporation's share-
holders as merely one in a laundry list of "factors" or "interests" the
directors may consider. Some states permit-or even mandate-the cir-
cular process of corporate indemnification of settlement amounts or judg-
ment amounts paid in derivative litigation. Finally, and wholly apart
from the substantive effect of these statutes, some raise perplexing issues
of interpretation. In some cases, "back to the drafting board" has much
to recommend it as a future course of action.
123. See TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT AN. art. 7.06(B) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
124. See text accompanying notes 46-57 supra.
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